Abstract
Introduction
Introducing new access control security features into operating systems is an expensive process, both in terms of development and long-term maintenance of the product. A variety of approaches for security extension exist, but all have substantial problems, ranging from concerns over technical correctness to high maintenance costs. The cost and complexity of such extensions has limited the transfer of new access control technology from the security research community to broader COTS product lines, resulting in substantial and unnecessary vulnerability to common attacks.
Network Associates Laboratories and the TrustedBSD Project have implemented an extensible and modular kernel access control framework permitting new access control policies to be introduced into the FreeBSD kernel. The TrustedBSD Mandatory Access Control (MAC) Framework addresses many of the challenges associated with adding new access control services to operating system kernels by £ This work was supported in part by DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035.
abstracting common infrastructure services from policies, reducing the cost and complexity of policy authoring. This includes providing policy-independent label storage for kernel objects, and persistent storage of labels using file system extended attributes. The MAC Framework composes results from simultaneously loaded access control policies in a predictable and reliable manner, permitting appropriately crafted policies to be used in concert.
Background
FreeBSD is a widely deployed production-quality open source operating system. It is used extensively in network service environments, and as a basis for many high end embedded network devices (routers, firewalls), and storage devices (storage appliances, SANs). FreeBSD development has included security features required in common deployment, but development effort has not specifically focused on access control extension. Its wide deployment makes it an excellent target for technology transfer activities.
Limitations to Existing Extension Models
Many extension models have been considered by the research and commercial operating system communities, including direct modification of the system source code, system call interposition, and stacked file systems. These models have substantial limitations: some are inherent to extending complex systems, but others are properties of the extension mechanisms. All assume lack of interest in the security extension from the perspective of the original OS vendor, or a commitment only to a narrow set of extensions:
Many models require access to the system source code, requiring involvement of the operating system vendor.
Operating systems change frequently over the lifetime of a product, be it version upgrades, service packets, or hotfixes, requiring expensive extension updates.
Operating system primitives such as threading and shared memory violate assumptions of several common extension models, introducing race conditions. Kernel wrapping techniques often introduce races as they are unable to properly lock kernel objects due to lock orders and recursion avoidance.
When more than one security extension is loaded into the system, they frequently interact poorly, bypassing each others protections or behaving unpredictably.
Security extension requires extensive knowledge and modification of the operating system kernel, resulting in high costs in terms of time investment and expertise.
MAC Framework Approach
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework is designed to address these problems in security policy augmentation. As FreeBSD is open source, and its developers are willing to accept new extension services, we adopted an approach that assumes that the operating system vendor understands the need for reliable and extensive augmentation. Primary design concerns were:
Operate correctly in concurrent environments.
Do not commit to a particular access control policy.
Permit implementors of policies to make trade-offs between security and performance.
Permit independent policies to operate in parallel.
Kernel services are aware only of the framework, never policy-specific elements.
Capture common policy-agnostic elements of frequently used models in the framework, avoiding reimplementation for each security extension.
Permit third parties to ship security extensions without the need for complicated local modifications.
MAC Framework Design
We adopt a modular approach that extends both the kernel and user applications to support new security models.
In the kernel, a modular framework provides common infrastructure for policies (labeling), the ability to augment "important" security decisions, and composition of active policies in a predictable manner. Policies "plug in" as kernel For user applications, the framework permits policyagnostic security-aware applications, not just policy-aware applications, to interact with active policies. Information is exported from the framework to support policy monitoring and common administration elements. FreeBSD system components are modified to support a wide range of policies.
MAC Interface to Kernel Services
The MAC Framework presents a set of entry points to selected kernel services, permitting the services to provide event notification to the framework, and providing the ability for the MAC Framework to maintain security labels within kernel objects provided by the kernel services.
MAC Interface to Security Policies
The MAC Framework provides several interfaces to security extensions, including interfaces for policy management, label storage and management, object life cycles, access control, and system events. Extensions implement subsets of the available interfaces, allowing implementors to select the events and services relevant to a particular policy.
MAC Interface to User Processes
The MAC Framework provides APIs that reflect operations commonly exported by policies. This includes interfaces to manage policies present in the kernel, and a flexible labeling API for retrieving and setting security properties of relevant kernel objects.
Access Control Entry Points
Entry points are scattered throughout the kernel, including process management, file systems, IPC, and the network stack. In general, access control entry points accept access control context (requesting credential, target object(s), and other arguments), and invoke each registered policy generating a success or failure. Results from each policy are composed by the framework with a simple composition policy requiring all policies to succeed. The composition selects on error based on precedence if a check fails.
Label Management
A number of access control policies rely on security labels maintained on objects for the purpose of access control decisions. Their labels store sensitivity, integrity, type, or other information about a kernel object available to policies for decision-making. The framework supports labels on several classes of security-relevant objects, including file systems, processes, IPC, and network stack elements.
Each structure holds one or more instances of a policyagnostic label structure for policy data. This structure is intended to provide maximum semantic flexibility for policies to implement desired behavior: each policy reserving label state is allocated a slot in the label, and each slot holds either a void pointer and an integer. Labels are initialized, allocated, and destroyed along with their object.
Kernel Policy Module Design
TrustedBSD MAC policies are encapsulated in loadable kernel modules. At the option of the developer or administrator, a policy module may be linked to the kernel at buildtime, loaded prior to kernel start at boot-time, or loaded at run-time. Some policies require ubiquitous access to all system objects-for locking reasons, this access can only be guaranteed if the module is present from inception, requiring those policies to be loaded before boot. Policy modules typically follow a common structure:
Policies contain a description structure processed when the policy is initialized. It holds policy meta-data, label information, and references to other policy structures. One structure holds a mapping of policy entry points to functions that implement them. Policies may implement an arbitrary subset of the entry points; they may provide a function for each entry point, or implement entry points with identical prototypes using the same function.
Policy modules typically isolate label management from the implementation of their policy, relying on a set of common primitives to implement most entry points. Access control logic is usually centralized in the module source files to make it easier to understand and modify.
User Application Approach
For the purposes of the MAC Framework, applications may be divided into three categories:
Applications that are not aware of any non-UNIX access control policies. From the perspective of this class of applications, no specific adaptation is required. Applications may become aware of the MAC Framework as a result of new behavior in the system (most frequently, new failures), but this is purely a property of the policies registered with the framework and currently active.
Applications that are aware of the MAC Framework, but unaware of specific policies. These applications are typically system applications that are either used to monitor and set object labels, or interact with user credentials. These programs treat labels in an abstract, policy-agnostic manner.
Applications that are aware of a specific set of policies. Depending on the nature of the the application, developers may choose to use the policy-agnostic interfaces provided by the MAC Framework, or new policy-specific interfaces exported specifically by a policy.
Potential Technology Applications
The TrustedBSD MAC Framework presents many opportunities relating to both future research and immediate development and deployment. As the framework is available in a COTS operating system, it is easily accessible to other researchers, as well as for product development.
Areas for future research faciliated by the framework include dynamic response to changing security requirements. While currently the loading and configuration of kernel policy modules is driven solely by direct administrator activity, the framework could easily support dynamic insertion and replacement of policy elements in response to environmental changes. For example, security policies could be adapted due to a change in applications on the system, or in response to a newly discovered attack or vulnerability.
Demonstration scenarios for the technology have focussed on rapid prototyping of security adaptions, introduction of policy to support new system security requirements, and run-time enforcement of security invariants.
Getting the Software
At the time of the writing of this brief, the TrustedBSD MAC Framework is under final development and initial deployment for the release of FreeBSD 5.0. The TrustedBSD MAC Framework, as well as a number of sample policy modules, will be present in the FreeBSD 5.0 distribution. This software may be downloaded from:
http://www.FreeBSD.org/
